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Far East Economic Review: HONG KONG: Business: The Biggest Victim By Philip Segal/HONG KONG
Moves to outlaw sedition and subversion have generated a storm of protest. Even bankers and
businessmen are criticizing proposals that may end Hong Kong's freedoms and change the way that
business is done Issue cover-dated December 19, 2002 REMEMBER WHEN the world's attention was focused on Hong Kong's handover to China in 1997?
After a few speeches and the arrival of some mainland Chinese soldiers, nothing much changed that
day, and the hordes of dignitaries and journalists went away. ONE COUNTRY, ONE SYSTEM? Proposals to outlaw subversion and sedition amount to mixing the
legal systems in Hong Kong and China They spark rare criticism from Hong Kong business leaders worried
about curbs on the free flow of information Lawyers say that the plans are not clear enough to protect basic
rights and freedoms It turns out perhaps they were five years early. The handover looks to be happening now, as the
government seeks to push through sweeping changes that could affect the very way of life in Hong
Kong, as well as how businesses assess the risk of operating in China's special administrative
region. In 1997, there was no sudden erosion of personal liberties, no perceptible shifting in the way
business was done in Hong Kong--Asia's most important financial center outside Tokyo and the one
city that China needs most to raise the money it requires to keep growing. So what's so big about these coming changes? Put simply, the common-law foundation that made Hong
Kong great is for the first time being intertwined with the more unpredictable and heavy-handed rule
by legal decree introduced 53 years ago by the Chinese Communist Party. If Hong Kong has rule of law
by courts that interpret the law, China has rule by the law, in which courts are subservient to
leaders. Under the new laws, fund managers running joint ventures with affiliates of Taiwan's
pro-independence party, for instance, could find themselves in hot water. Other measures may get
journalists jailed for stealing "state secrets" if government officials leak economic
statistics. That could make it very hard for the press to do its job properly. The government in September released initial proposals for a variety of potentially intrusive new
laws known as the Article 23 measures, named after the part of Hong Kong's Basic Law, or
mini-constitution, that mandates the outlawing of such acts as "subversion." The government waited five years before acting in a real hurry. Despite circulating vague
proposals, it has issued no formal "white paper" with the exact language of the draft
laws. "We've not seen in black and white how the legislation will be drafted," says Anson
Chan, the former head of the civil service and No. 2 to Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and former
Governor Chris Patten. "The devil is in the detail." The new laws are nothing less than the clash of legal systems that much of the world thought it
would see in 1997 when Hong Kong returned to China under the "one country, two systems"
formula. In addition to possession of state secrets and subversion, Article 23 orders Hong Kong to
outlaw treason, secession and sedition, but the government uses definitions so broad as to frighten
those concerned with the preservation of civil rights. On December 9, the Hong Kong Bar Association said the proposals were "based upon feudal
notions of treason" that are not clear or precise enough to protect fundamental rights and
freedoms. The proposal for outlawing secession "fails to recognize the possibility of a
secessionist cause being a legitimate political demand in the form of an exercise by a people of the
right to self-determination," the association said. Hong Kong already outlaws most Article 23 offences. But Article 23 is tricky because of the
potentially explosive combination of two systems of law. "One country, two systems" is
supposed to separate the systems, after all, not have elements of both at work in both
jurisdictions. Getting the handover right in this financial centre matters to many more than just its residents.
China doesn't want to make so many changes that panic ensues. Hong Kong had to lash its currency to
the U.S. dollar in 1983 to prevent alarm after it became clear Britain was preparing to hand its
colony back. After the Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing in 1989, thousands of well-to-do Hong Kong
people lined up for foreign passports as potential escape routes. But if some Hong Kong's citizens have shown how nervous they are about Beijing rule, the city's
business elite hasn't. What is almost unprecedented now, and what probably worries China as much as
mass protests, is a newly critical tone that business is taking toward the Article 23 plans before
they are introduced to the Legislative Council where a pro-Beijing majority will ensure it passes. Banker David Li, who represents the banking industry in the Legislative Council (and who is a
director of Dow Jones, the owner of the REVIEW), told the American Chamber of Commerce in early
December that executives from more than 10 foreign banks hoped the Hong Kong government would spell
out the exact wording of the proposals. He said banks were worried about their potential to stifle
the free flow of information here. For Hong Kong's reticent business leaders that amounted to shouting from the rooftops. Li and
individual bankers declined subsequent comment, but the message was clear. It followed an unusually
frank letter to Secretary for Security Regina Ip from the British Chamber of Commerce. In its
"Dear Regina" letter, it recommended much narrower definitions of "sedition" and
"state secrets" than those proposed by the administration. On state secrets, the chamber said: "The problem here is that the expression 'state secret'
is borrowed from Chinese law and usage. If the principle of 'one country, two systems' is to be
maintained, it is essential that the definition of a 'state secret' under Hong Kong law is not as
widely drawn as it is under mainland law." The aim was "to remove any possibility that
economic information or other data not related to genuine security concerns, could be considered a
'state secret.'" American Chamber of Commerce Chairman Jim Thompson is unusually outspoken on Article 23. "We
think the present government will enforce it fairly. But when future people in Hong Kong are in
charge, they may interpret it differently," he says, calling for narrower definitions of what
constitutes state secrets, subversion and seditious publications. Chief Executive Tung maintains the proposals are good for Hong Kong, and for China, and will have
no impact on civil rights and liberties. "We will convince the sceptics," he told
legislators in October. Nothing will likely change the day after the Article 23 laws are passed. But this may mean
nothing. Britain had harsh laws on the books in Hong Kong, but showed great restraint against using
them. China has displayed no such restraint. In fact, its officials have supported what could be
some worrying scenarios for Hong Kong's freedoms. Take the theft of state secrets. In 1994 mainland-born Hong Kong journalist Xi Yang was sentenced
to 12 years in jail on the mainland for stealing state economic secrets--a leak on interest-rate
policy and possible gold sales from a Bank of China source who was jailed for 15 years. The official
Xinhua news agency said Xi's action caused China "serious loss," though it's still hard to
see what that was. That sort of thing could happen in Hong Kong post-Article 23. The government proposes to expand
on the current Official Secrets Ordinance by introducing "a new offence of unauthorized and
damaging disclosure of protected information obtained by unauthorized access," according to
Secretary of Justice Elsie Leung. In future, unless the government formally releases information,
anyone holding that information could be prosecuted for theft of state secrets. To establish whether
a secret was stolen, all the state might have to show is that a person was "unauthorized"
to have that information. State secrets include "information relating to relations between the central authorities of
the People's Republic of China" and Hong Kong. Lawyer Ronnie Tong, an opponent of the
proposals, demanded much greater detail because "uncertainty will lead to
self-censorship." In a pamphlet, Tong said the interests of the central authorities can be pretty much what China
wants. ". . . There is no safeguard that interests of the central authorities will not be
defined by mainland concepts and such definitions may not be reviewable by the local courts,"
he said. Finally, note how it is proposed to enforce the new laws: With new police powers of
emergency entry, search and seizure, without any court order needed. HONG KONG MAY BOW TO BEIJING "This is the worst of all proposals in the consultation paper," wrote Hong Kong lawyer
Audrey Eu, a former head of the Hong Kong Bar Association. The law would be "a bridge for
extending the mainland system to Hong Kong. Once the [Chinese] government has banned an organization
on national security grounds, it is difficult to expect Hong Kong authorities or Hong Kong courts to
contend a different view." Even Hong Kong agrees with that last part. Its consultation document on the proposed laws
concedes that the territory "may not be in a position to determine whether an organization
poses a threat to national security." Therefore, largely "we should defer to the decision
of the central authorities based on the comprehensive information that it possesses." Hong Kong guarantees freedom of religion and the Falun Gong spiritual movement can operate
despite being banned on the mainland. But suppose China banned a religion on national security
grounds. In the clash of freedom over national security, probably few would bet on freedom winning
the day in Hong Kong. Since the handover in 1997, time after time Hong Kong's institutions have come under fire from
inside Hong Kong or directly from China. Newspapers were warned by China not to report the views of
pro-independence politicians in Taiwan; Chinese government organizations were retroactively exempted
from a variety of Hong Kong laws in 1998; and most notably, Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal was
overruled by Beijing on an immigration case after it delivered a unanimous decision in 1999 at odds
with what the Hong Kong government wanted. Meanwhile, Hong Kong is under less scrutiny by the big
Western powers. This may have encouraged the government to press ahead with its plans. Given the signs since 1997, it is no surprise that the Article 23 laws are potentially harsh. But
did Beijing push Hong Kong into acting now? And what interest does China have in eroding Hong Kong's
rule of law, given that it is a major business advantage for the territory? China says little when it comes to its views on Article 23. Perhaps that's because the mainland
doesn't have to say much. In marking the fifth anniversary of Hong Kong's handover, President Jiang
Zemin on July 1 last year referred to its "fairly sound and complete legal system."
Possibly this qualified assessment was taken by local authorities as a signal to start moving on
Article 23. Yet China certainly doesn't want panic. Perhaps more desirable for Beijing, though, is a gentle
waning of confidence in Hong Kong's separateness. The British Chamber of Commerce warned in November
that the new powers to proscribe organizations already banned on the mainland "appear to give
the Chinese authorities a substantial foothold in the criminal law of [Hong Kong]. It is important
that the line between Hong Kong and mainland law is not blurred." Could it be that gradual blurring is exactly the desired effect? The opposition Democratic
Party's founding chairman, Martin Lee, says business people from the United States are starting to
look at Shanghai as a better place to invest in than Hong Kong. "They accept that Hong Kong is
still miles ahead of Shanghai in the rule of law, but they see a trend: China's rule of law is going
up, and Hong Kong's is going down," he says. Posting date: 12/13/2002
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