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-- Dr. Shiyu Zhou, Professor at Rutgers University

-- Excerpt from a July, 2000 article by CNN's Senior China Analyst, Willy Wo-Lap Lam

Appendix A: House Concurrent Resolution 188. 21

Appendix B: FDI -- The April 25 Incident (an excerpt) 23

Appendix C: FDI -- Crisis News Bulletin, Aug. 30, 2000. 24

Appendix D: FDI -- Crisis News Bulletin, Oct. 19, 2000. 25

Appendix E: Statement Before Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 26

Appendix F: In The News...... 30

CNN: China's Suppression Carries a High Price. 30

CNN: China Wages 'Big-Bucks Diplomacy' 33

Deutsche Welle: Berlin Tastes Tiananmen. 36

Wall Streel Journal: Death Trap: How One Chinese City Resorted to Atrocities to Control Falun Dafa? 39

Whereas Falun Gong is a peaceful and nonviolent form of personal belief and practice with millions of adherents in the People's Republic of China and elsewhere; (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

HCON 188 EH

107th CONGRESS

2d Session

Whereas Falun Gong is a peaceful and nonviolent form of personal belief and practice with millions of adherents in the People's Republic of China and elsewhere;

Whereas the Government of the People's Republic of China has forbidden Falun Gong practitioners to practice their beliefs, and has systematically attempted to eradicate the practice and those who follow it;

Whereas this policy violates the Constitution of the People's Republic of China as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Whereas Jiang Zemin's regime has created notorious government '610' offices throughout the People's Republic of China with the special task of overseeing the persecution of Falun Gong members through organized brainwashing, torture, and murder;

Whereas propaganda from state-controlled media in the People's Republic of China has inundated the public in an attempt to breed hatred and discrimination;

Whereas the number of known deaths from torture has reached 422 so far, tens of thousands have been tortured while confined in labor camps, prisons, and mental hospitals, and hundreds of thousands have been forced to attend brainwashing classes;

Whereas official measures have been taken to conceal all atrocities, such as the immediate cremation of victims, the blocking of autopsies, and the false labeling of deaths as from suicide or natural causes;

Whereas women in particular have been the target of numerous forms of sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, and forced abortion;

Whereas the campaign of persecution has been generated by the Government of the People's Republic of China, is carried out by government officials and police at all levels, and has permeated every segment of society and every level of government in the People's Republic of China; and

Whereas several United States citizens and permanent resident aliens have been subjected to arbitrary detention, imprisoned, and tortured in the People's Republic of China: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China should cease its persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, and its representatives in the United States should cease their harassment of citizens and residents of the United States who practice Falun Gong and cease their attempts to put pressure on officials of State and local governments in the United States to refuse or withdraw support for the Falun Gong and its practitioners;

(2) the United States Government should use every appropriate public and private forum to urge the Government of the People's Republic of China--

(A) to release from detention all Falun Gong practitioners and put an end to the practices of torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment against them and other prisoners of conscience; and

(B) to abide by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by allowing Falun Gong practitioners to pursue their personal beliefs; and

(3) the United States Government should investigate allegations of illegal activities in the United States of the Government of the People's Republic of China and its representatives and agents, including allegations of unlawful harassment of United States citizens and residents who practice Falun Gong and of officials of State and local governments in the United States who support Falun Gong, and should take appropriate action, including but not limited to enforcement of the immigration laws, against any such representatives or agents who engage in such illegal activities.

Passed the House of Representatives July 24, 2002.

In the evening of April 25, Jiang Zemin, in the name of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, wrote a letter to the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and other relevant leaders. In the letter, Jiang Zemin charged that there were masterminds "behind the scenes" of the April 25^th Incident who were "planning and issuing commands." (This letter was marked "Highly Confidential," distributed as the central government office's issuance [1999] No. 14 entitled "Notice of the Communist Party Central Office regarding the printing and distribution of 'Comrade Jiang Zemin's Letter to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and other Concerned Leading Comrades'").

On June 7, Jiang Zemin gave a speech at the meeting of the central government's Politburo and stated, "The issue of 'Falun Gong' has very deep political and social background and even a complicated international background... It is the most serious incident since the political turbulence in 1989." On June 13, this document was secretly transmitted inside the Communist Party. (This document was categorized as highly confidential and issued by the central government office as [1999] No. 30 entitled "Notice of the Communist Party Central Office regarding the printing and distribution of 'The Speech of Comrade Jiang Zemin in the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Government Regarding Handling and Resolving the 'Falun Gong Issue' Without Delay").

Certain high-ranking officials within the Communist Party have revealed that in the above two classified documents, Jiang clearly raised the issue of "whether there were overseas and Western connections to the April 25 incident and whether there were 'masterminds' behind the scenes who were planning and issuing commands."They have revealed Jiang's mentality of being overly protective of his personal power and interests, and how, without any concrete evidence, he made the erroneous policy decision to persecute Falun Gong.

From late May 1999, the daily practice activities of Falun Gong practitioners in many areas were subject to forced dispersal by the city administrative agencies and the Public Security Bureau. The public security officers in some areas used high pressure hoses to drive practitioners away and high volume loudspeakers to disturb their practice. The persons in charge of the Falun Gong assistance centers were called in by their workplaces and by public security officers for discussion and interrogation, they were put under surveillance and followed, their phones were tapped, and they were not allowed to leave the local area.

During a high level meeting on July 19, Jiang Zemin officially announced confirmation of a total ban on Falun Gong. July 20^th saw the beginning of a wave of arrests of Falun Gong practitioners all across the nation.

For the complete report, visit: http://www.faluninfo.net/SpecialTopics/april25abridged.html

NEW YORK, August 30, 200 (Falun Dafa Information Center) -- Reliable sources in China have disclosed plans issued by Chinese Communist head, Jiang Zemin, to mount a new attempt to wipe out Falun Gong within three months. The new plan is called "Destroying the reputation of Falun Gong completely, exhausting Falun Gong practitioners financially, and eradicating Falun Gong within three months."

Reports received by the Falun Dafa Information Center indicate that on August 21, 2000, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security held a nationwide telephone conference to relay new orders from Jiang. Its key point: "further intensify the crackdown on Falun Gong." The plan recommends that some practitioners considered "backbone figures" be "heavily punished." The authorities also reportedly discussed executing certain practitioners who have remained faithful to their beliefs. The purpose of such a move is apparently to threaten a large number by killing a few. The Falun Dafa Information Center welcomes further media investigations of this new policy before it is implemented.

NEW YORK, October 19, 2000 (Falun Dafa Information Center) -- As a spiritual practice deeply rooted in Chinese society, Falun Gong practitioners in China often have access to non-public documents and information. Obviously these sources must remain confidential, but a recently "leaked" missive has given us cause for genuine alarm: Reliable sources inside China have revealed that Jiang Zemin and his group of supporters within the Chinese government are implementing a new policy to "intensify the struggle [against Falun Gong] overseas."

According to these same sources inside China, on October 12th, a highly classified document was sent out from the central government via an internal telegram to the military and top officials at the Ministry level. Sources report that the document now classifies Falun Gong as 'counter-revolutionary,' as 'anti-Party,' and as an 'anti-socialist organization' -- the same terms used against the student protesters just prior to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Perhaps the most insidious item in the document, however, is one that explicitly calls for "intensifying the campaign overseas against those foreign forces, collect more information, and prevent protests," indicating greater actions may be taken beyond Chinese borders in the months to come.

Practitioners in Australia, Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have long reported harassment from Chinese consulate officers and government agents. In the U.S, Chinese consulate and other government officials have contacted a number of mayoral offices around the country as well as major universities (including Cal-Tech) in an effort to block Falun Gong activities. Additionally, there have been many documented cases of practitioners, including American citizens, being followed on U.S. soil and having their email systems attacked from inside China. In one of the more blatant and outrageous incidents in recent days, a homeless Chinese woman in Tokyo told police that she had been given money by P.R.C. agents to pretend that she was a Falun Gong practitioner and to engage in illegal actions so as to smear the image of Falun Gong.

The Falun Dafa Information Center is asking governmental and news agencies around the world to closely monitor this situation. We anticipate an increasing amount of activity of this sort in the months to come as P.R.C. personnel attempt to carry out their new orders. We can only guess at what kinds of tactics Jiang Zemin and his associates will use in the near future, and just how far they will go to extend their campaign of intimidation and defamation overseas.

We encourage you to contact the Falun Dafa Information Center if you have questions or need clarification regarding any particular incidents of this nature.

Statement by Shiyu Zhou, Ph.D.

University of Pennsylvania & Rutgers University

Mr. Chairman, members of this Commission, ladies and gentlemen:

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on the subject of human rights and rule of law in the People's Republic of China.

Looking back at the 50 year history of communist China, what we see is pitifully not a history of rule of law, but a history of rule of man, and one that neglects human rights. From the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's and 70's, to the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, to the brutal suppression of Falun Gong and other faith groups today, one traces a bloody history in which the ruling, communist regime has carried out a program of state terrorism against its own culture and citizens.

In what follows, I would like to briefly discuss the current state of human rights and the rule of law in China from three different perspectives. I will use the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong as an illustration. There are, of course, other examples of persecution campaigns in China at present, including the official suppression of Tibetan Buddhists and Christian "house churches." The government's campaign against Falun Gong, though, distinguishes itself by virtue of the sheer number of persons affected and the intensity of the campaign.

The first perspective to consider is that the communist authorities in Beijing flatly ignore and violate existing laws in order to deprive Falun Gong practitioners and other Chinese citizens of their human rights.

In the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Articles 33 through 50 explicitly state the "fundamental rights" of Chinese citizens, which include freedom of speech, assembly, association, and religious belief. However, numerous reports from human rights groups around the world and international media reveal exactly the opposite. Most notably, in the government's campaign against Falun Gong, the rights of adherents which are supposedly set forth in every single one of these Articles have been violated, and in many cases violated flagrantly. Perpetrators of these abuses, such as police and prison wardens, have been promoted for their brutality; outside investigations are blocked; and authorities insist across the board that no transgressions have occurred.

The primary mechanism used by Jiang Zemin to persecute Falun Gong is a notorious and unconstitutional organization called the "6-10 Office," which spans multiple levels of government, having absolute power over each level of administration in the Party as well as over the political and judiciary branches. Since its establishment in June of 1999, the 6-10 Office has become nothing short of China's modern day equivalent to the Gestapo, orchestrating a three-year long, horrific persecution against Falun Gong and its practitioners that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of cases of arbitrary detention, false imprisonment, defamation, kidnapping, torture, sexual and psychiatric abuse, disappearance, and murder.

But the terror of the 6-10 Office is experienced not only by practitioners of the Falun Gong, but by virtually the entire population of China. The office incites hatred against Falun Gong through imposing direct pressure on even those who have no connection to Falun Gong. Examples of this include, in many regions, children in grade school being forced to sign statements denouncing Falun Gong at the threat of expulsion; adults being forced to sign similar statements or lose their jobs or pensions; and police, too, being threatened with loss of salary, residential privileges, or even employment should they not carry out the orders of the 6-10 Office; neighbors and co-workers are forced, via threat, to monitor those around them who might practice Falun Gong and report on them. The constitutional rights of virtually everyone in Chinese society have been violated by this government-sanctioned and official terrorist organization.

The second perspective is that of arbitrarily contrived laws. The communist authorities in Beijing can simply make up so-called "laws" to justify their unconstitutional human rights abuses where there is no, and should never be any, justification. The law is re-engineered to suit the political needs of the day.

In January of 2002, a number of media reported the story of a Hong Kong businessman who was sentenced to two years in prison in China for smuggling thousands of Bibles into Mainland China. The charge leveled against him was that he violated a so-called "anti-cult" law; Chinese authorities considered the Bibles he smuggled in "cult materials." So where did this "anti-cult" law come from? It was rushed through the Chinese legislature on October 30, 1999, five days after president Jiang Zemin was quoted in a French newspaper labeling Falun Gong a "cult," and three months after the government launched its suppression of Falun Gong. The "law" was made specifically to aid the persecution of Falun Gong at that time. Chinese authorities applied this so-called law retroactively to justify and heighten their violent persecution of Falun Gong. Sadly, this "law" was later used to persecute Christian "house churches" and other faith groups.

Laws should serve the purpose of protecting justice and freedom. But laws in Jiang Zemin's hands only become a suppressive tool for maintaining political power.

It is nothing new that Mainland authorities would manufacture bogus so-called "laws" to justify harsh, repressive political measures, or even to apply such laws retroactively to punish persons and groups for past actions and affiliations. But what is new is the appearance of such tactics in Hong Kong, a region that Beijing promised would retain its freewheeling, open way of life under a principle of "one country, two systems" for at least 50 years; that is, 50 years from the time it first became a part of the PRC in 1997.

Now after only 5 years, this promise is waning, or even crumbling, at an alarming pace.

The past year has seen constant debate among Hong Kong's ruling elite, led by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, over the adoption of so-called "anti-cult" and "anti-subversion" laws. These laws, analysts and observers note, would give legal grounds for Hong Kong to ban and suppress religious and other groups deemed unfavorable by Beijing authorities, the most notable example being the Falun Gong.

As we speak, a second matter in Hong Kong is of perhaps even greater immediate concern. Sixteen practitioners of the Falun Gong were recently put through a show-trial, officially labeled a "criminal trial," for allegedly disrupting social order this past March when they supposedly "obstructed the sidewalk" by meditating and are accused of "attacking the police." The location was outside the Chinese (that is, PRC) Liaison Office of Hong Kong. Of the 16, fully 4 are Swiss nationals. The group was forcefully arrested without any warrant by Hong Kong police. However, eyewitness reports and video documentation reveal that it was actually the police who obstructed the sidewalk and attacked persons. The footage, which is available online, shows the peaceful meditators in two short, orderly rows, taking up a seven-square-meter spot in a 140-square-meter open area, and then being overwhelmed by throngs of police, probably several dozen, and violently choked, gouged in the eyes, and jabbed in their pressure points as they are removed to police vans.

What is significant is that the arrests and removal took place reportedly under pressure from the Liaison Office; the office was irate that Hong Kong citizens and foreign nationals would demonstrate outside its premises against human rights abuses in the PRC; irate, that is, that they would dare use Hong Kong's constitutionally-enshrined freedoms of assembly and speech to embarrass the ruling Beijing regime.

The trial ended on August 15, 2002, with all 16 Falun Gong practitioners being "convicted" and given fines. Many analysts agreed that the trial was partial, politically motivated, and a foregone conclusion. The defendants are now in the process of filing an appeal against the conviction.

The significance of this show trial cannot be understated. CNN recently reported that the trial has "raised concerns that the 'one country, two systems' policy is eroding, and that Hong Kong is beginning to yield to pressures from the mainland." What astute observers realize is that pressure from Jiang Zemin to restrict Falun Gong in Hong Kong is jeopardizing a once-proud legacy of freedoms and just legal system. The trial was very much a litmus test, a touchstone, if you will, for democracy and rule of law in Hong Kong. The very existence of this trial marks the negation of rule of law in the Hong Kong SAR, and the beginning of the end. Legal analysts say that the trial never should have happened to begin with. It marks the arrival of "rule of Jiang" and the departure of rule of law. This is something Hong Kong cannot afford, and this is something the free world and America cannot afford.

I would like to suggest that this situation be taken much more seriously. We have already seen in the past year and a half on two occasions scores of Americans and citizens of other nations being barred from entering Hong Kong due to their beliefs (they practiced Falun Gong); we learned, to our appall, that they were on a blacklist, presumably assembled by the PRC. Now we see a show trial being used to discredit a peaceful group of meditators and, secondly, to justify harsh, repressive legislation that is in the works and that will appease Jiang and the Beijing authorities. This is rule by fiat, or rule by Jiang, manifesting in Hong Kong.

The fundamental problem is not whether the P.R.C. has "law" or "rule of law." It does have law, only ruler Jiang Zemin is "the law" in China, and the communist dictatorship is the "rule of law." The dictatorship is more than willing to override existing statutes, or even to manufacture new so-called "laws" as fitting, to serve its political purposes or maintain power. A crude veneer of "law" is used to justify and veil what is by any account illegal and criminal behavior. And now, as we see in the case of Hong Kong and other nations, such as Iceland, most recently, Jiang and his leadership can even pressure governments and peoples of democratic societies to compromise their democratic values, institutions, and practices. This pressure has even been felt in the United States, as described in U.S. House Concurrent Resolution 188, passed just a few weeks ago by unanimous vote; the resolution goes beyond condemning the Jiang Zemin regime's persecution of Falun Gong in China to warning the regime against its attempts to bring its hate campaign to the U.S., where American citizens and local government officials who support or practice Falun Gong have been targeted by threat, harassment, and even violence.

The fundamental problem is that China's communist regime is a dictatorial state that is committed to the suppression of freedom of belief; the suppression of freedom of the press; and the suppression of legal rights, such as due process; and it makes liberal use of forceful indoctrination, violence and fear in order to terrorize and dominate ordinary citizens. These traits, as you will recognize, are precisely those that identify a terrorist state as such.

I would like to suggest, in closing, that this fundamental problem of lawlessness and state terrorism in the P.R.C. must assume much greater importance for U.S. policy-makers. To not do so, to overlook the problematic nature and ruling of the Beijing regime, is to build Sino-U.S. relations on shaky, faulty grounds. There are many things we can turn a blind eye to, but wishful thinking cannot be expected to bring about any real resolution or improvements on this front. Instead, it only allows the problem to fester, and worse yet, with our silence we embolden that very same leadership; silence, to the Jiang Zemin regime, is acquiescence. This is a grave mistake, I believe. We need look no further than the lessons of 9-11 to realize what evil can brew when it is left unchecked or overlooked.

After all, when a leader attacks his own citizens who are peaceful, non-violent, and good people, what will that leader do on the world stage? Could we possibly expect him to have any greater regard for the lives of good citizens in other nations?

Thank you for your attention.

February 9, 2001

By Willy Wo-Lap Lam

CNN.com Senior China Analyst

JIANG ZEMIN may succeed in suppressing the Falun Gong sect for now, but the president's prestige could suffer considerable damage. So could China's program of reforms. Jiang has mobilized a Mao-era mass movement against the quasi-Buddhist group, which is characterized as part of an "anti-China international movement."

Not since the anti-American crusade in the wake of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 have so many Chinese hit the streets in a government-orchestrated campaign. In terms of size and reach, the "struggle against the devilish cult" has surpassed many previous mass movements.

The official media has in the past week reported anti-Falun Gong gatherings of hundreds of thousands of people in provinces and cities including Henan, Sichuan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Ningxia, Shenyang, Shanghai and Beijing.

Meetings denouncing the sect have been held even in the remote western provinces--and by apparently irrelevant government units such as the weather bureau and the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. In a throw-back to the Cultural Revolution, there were hints the People's Liberation Army (PLA) might enter the fray.

The Xinhua news-agency quoted officers from the PLA and the para-military People's Armed Police as asserting that the sect was "an effort by hostile Western forces to subvert China." Officers from all divisions of the military forces have vowed to do their utmost to defend the central leadership and to "maintain national security and social stability."

Sources close to security departments in Beijing said Jiang was poised to take more drastic steps to reach his goal of eradicating the sect before the forthcoming 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. For example, the state security apparatus has identified about 40,000 Falun Gong practitioners among staff in Communist Party and government units, state enterprises and colleges.

These "cultists" have been told if they do not sign papers denouncing the sect, they will be fired--and their pensions confiscated.

Surveillance and harassment of sect members, who apparently do nothing more than practice their brand of slow breathing exercise at home, have been stepped up. There are reports that understaffed police authorities have recruited unemployed workers in the battle against the Falun Gong.

While the Jiang leadership may have genuine reasons to feel threatened by the sect, the quasi-Maoist tactics it has employed have raised serious questions.

"Even assuming the Falun Gong is spreading dangerous ideas, the way the leadership has whipped up the masses to fight a 'global anti-China conspiracy' is disturbing," says a Beijing academic who wants to remain anonymous. "The Jiang leadership has yet to show proof of the Falun Gong's links to anti-China elements in the United States and the West."

The anti-U.S. and anti-NATO riots in May 1999 should have taught Beijing the lesson that Cultural Revolution-vintage campaigns could backfire. A few days after the demonstrations took place, Beijing had to rein them in because many protesters were taking advantage of the melee to vent their grievances against the central government.

Moreover, draconian steps such as cutting off the pay and pension of unrepentant Falun Gong affiliates in government departments and enterprises risk further radicalizing the sect. In the long run, social unrest may be exacerbated if underground Falun Gong activists were to wage a kind of protracted guerrilla warfare against Beijing.

Yet the most severe criticism leveled at Jiang's handling of the Falun Gong is that he seems to be using the mass movement to promote allegiance to himself.

As with campaigns dating from the 1960s, the standard ritual of ideological sessions held in party units, factories, and colleges the past few years is that participants make public declarations of support for the Beijing line--and for the top leader.

For example, the theme of the anti-American crusade in 1999 was not just beating back the "anti-China conspiracy of the United States-led NATO" but professing unreserved support for the "central leadership with comrade Jiang Zemin as its core."

According to a party veteran, Jiang might want a public show of support for himself if only because the Politburo had divergent views on what to do with the Falun Gong.

It is no secret that several Politburo members thought the president had used the wrong tactics. They ranged from moderates such as Premier Zhu Rongji, Vice President Hu Jintao, and head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan to conservatives such as National People's Congress Chairman Li Peng.

For example, both Li Ruihuan and Zhu--who met Falun Gong representatives shortly after they had staged the now-famous demonstration outside party headquarters in April 1999--were said to favor a conciliatory approach.

"By unleashing a Mao-style movement, Jiang is forcing senior cadres to pledge allegiance to his line," said the party veteran. "This will boost Jiang's authority--and may give him enough momentum to enable him to dictate events at the pivotal 16th Communist Party congress next year."

So far, however, Jiang has only been moderately successful in the loyalty game. Among top-level officials, Zhu and Hu have publicly supported the harsh measures. However, Li Ruihuan, whose best known motto is "seeking harmony and reconciliation," has kept quiet on the anti-Falun Gong struggle.

Political analysts said Jiang ran a big risk by staking his reputation on the early extermination of the sect.

"Jiang wants the Falun Gong rooted out when he makes his big speech at the Great Hall of the People on July 1 to mark the 80th anniversary of the party's founding," said a Western diplomat.

"But what if the sect refuses to disappear? Many Falun Gong members are known for their dare-to-die fanaticism. If anti-Beijing protests either in the capital or the provinces continue throughout the year, Jiang's prestige will suffer tremendously."

Moderate cadres and academics in Beijing also think the return of Mao-style political campaigns will deal a blow to economic and political reforms. For example, this will send Western governments and investors the wrong message about Beijing's commitment to burying the xenophobia--and mass hysteria--of bygone eras.

Since late last year, liberal members of official think tanks have dropped hints about the leadership's readiness to resume political reform in the run-up to the 16th party congress.

However, the revival of Maoist norms--including using para-military forces against an apparently non-violent religious group, and promoting unthinking loyalty to the president--would seem to indicate Jiang and company are putting their vested interests before the reforms.

http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/05/china.willycolumn/index.html

June 18, 2002

By Willy Wo-Lap Lam

CNN.com Senior China Analyst

HONG KONG, China (CNN) --"When you have lots of money, you can afford to huff and puff," Deng Xiaoping liked to say before he lapsed into senility in the mid-1990s.

The late patriarch was referring to the powers of the market economy.

And while Deng asked his followers to take a low international profile so China could concentrate on making money, the eastern giant seems to be throwing its weight around the global stage thanks to its newfound wealth.

In a glaring instance of money-aided "great power diplomacy," Iceland banned followers of the Falun Gong spiritual sect -- which is labeled an "evil cult" in China -- from entering the country during President Jiang Zemin's visit last week.

Reykjavik turned away at least 60 Falun Gong members, saying it did not have enough police to protect the Chinese VIP.

The move led to angry remarks from the U.S. State Department, as well as protests by human rights groups, who said Reykjavik had bowed to Chinese pressure and put economic benefits above its commitment to global norms on civil rights.

But this is not the first time that Beijing has used the business card to score diplomatic points.

The year 2002 marked the first time the Geneva-based United Nations Subcommittee on Human Rights did not sponsor a resolution condemning China's human rights records.

With the United States no longer a member, no European country was willing to take the heat -- and the threats of Beijing withdrawing trading and investment opportunities.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership first demonstrated what its critics called bullying tactics in 1997, when Denmark was bold enough to move a resolution slamming Beijing's treatment of dissidents and ethnic minorities.

At that time, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said: "This anti-Chinese resolution will, I think, in the end become a rock that smashes on the Danish Government's head."

Beijing went on to cancel all commercial contracts with the Scandinavian nation. A year later, Copenhagen, and quite a few other European capitals, apparently wised up.

Since then, the CCP administration has dangled supposedly lucrative trading and investment prospects to achieve a plethora of goals.

These include efforts to persuade E.U. members not to sell arms to Taiwan, or to take a line on Iraq -- and the Muslim world in general.

Beijing's fairly successful deployment of renminbi diplomacy, as much as winning the bid to host the 2008 Olympics, is evidence that what Napoleon called the "sleeping giant" is awake and kicking.

With China's GDP posed to overtake France's this year -- and that of the United Kingdom around 2005 -- the Asian giant is expected to flex its diplomatic muscle more vigorously.

To a large extent, of course, all nations use economic tools such as trade, investments or the export of rare materials as foreign-policy levers.

And it may be a good sign if Beijing has decided to use "cash diplomacy" rather than its fast-developing military arsenal to achieve objectives such as national reunification.

For example, tension in the Taiwan Strait will be lowered if CCP leaders are convinced that attractions -- such as a 1.3-billion-people market -- are sufficient to attain economic and ultimately political integration with the "renegade province."

After all, around one million Taiwanese -- including business moguls and IT professionals -- are already living in coastal China.

And the cause of peace may be advanced if a business-comes-first leadership in Beijing is persuaded that force is no longer that necessary.

However, in waging big-bucks diplomacy, Beijing has to bear in mind that economic might does not necessarily make it right.

In fact an excessively aggressive use of this strategy could backfire.

Given the non-transparent if not dictatorial political system in China, it is easy for critics -- particularly those in countries that feel jostled by the rising giant -- to argue persuasively that an economically strong China will build up a threatening army and strut about the world stage in an arrogant manner.

Beijing's cynical deployment of the business card seems to have fed the "China Threat" theory in America.

And this is one reason why despite Beijing's legions of diplomatic and intelligence personnel in America -- and its multi-million dollar lobbying budget -- out-gunned Taipei seems to be winning more sympathy among U.S. congressmen, non-government organizations (NGOs) and editorial writers.

Beijing's crude display of economic muscle has also fanned a similar version of China Threat in Japan, China's nervous neighbor -- and erstwhile foe.

Beijing believes the rise of right-wing, quasi-militaristic forces in Japan alone is to blame for the dramatic growth of anti-Chinese sentiments among the Japanese public.

Money isn't everything

Even Taiwan, which is most susceptible to the magnet called the China market, has demonstrated that money isn't everything.

Last December's parliamentary elections -- in which pro-independence politicians made unexpected gains and President Chen Shui-bian showed staying power -- suggests that coastal China's affluence may not necessarily inspire respect, let alone a passion for political union.

Recent setbacks in Beijing's ties with America and Japan -- as well as an impasse on the Taiwan front -- has highlighted the old argument that to be a responsible world power, a country has to do more than chalk up a 7% growth rate year after year.

An aspiring superpower also needs some strong claims to a moral high ground that is based on recognized international norms.

After all, in his treatises on governance, Confucius laid much more store on moral authority than economic prowess or brute military force.

It is also instructive that in the mid-1980s, China's heyday of political reform, the avant-garde Shanghai newspaper World Economic Herald ran a series of articles on the issue of qiuji, or membership in the community of nations.

The liberal paper's conclusion was that to earn its place in the sun, China must, in addition to an economic leap forward, attain high standards in areas such as political liberalization and human rights.

Jiang, then mayor of Shanghai, won Deng's praise for "ideological rectitude and resoluteness" for suppressing the Herald even as students in Shanghai and Beijing campuses were holding unprecedented large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations.

It is perhaps difficult for Jiang, whose spirits must have soared above the Icelandic volcanoes last week, to appreciate the fact that economic or military clout needs to be tempered with a Confucianist -- or "Western" -- precept of morality and democracy.

For every government bureaucrat or business leader that has been cowed by China's renminbi power, however, considerably more parliamentarians, NGOs or ordinary citizens may be buying the China Threat theory.

http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/18/willy.column

April 11, 2002

The excuses given by Germany's government may be unsurprising: diplomatic protocol and heightened security.

But followers of Falun Gong -- a meditative martial art banned in communist China as an "evil cult" yet considered unthreatening elsewhere -- were plenty surprised Monday and Tuesday when they faced German police resistance to their peaceful protests during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin.

Between a dozen and 20 believers in Falun Gong, similar to tai chi or yoga but with an element of religious teaching, were forced out of their reserved rooms Monday evening at Berlin's exclusive Hotel Adlon, where Jiang is staying, by German police working with Chinese state agents.

Some of those forced out were U.S. and British citizens who complained of rough treatment -- highly uncharacteristic of German police tactics, especially in protest-friendly Berlin.

Li Shao, a Chinese-born Briton and senior lecturer at Nottingham University in England, was one of those forced out of the hotel. He said he was also detained in a police van outside Berlin's city hall and searched by five "reluctant" German policemen on the request of a Chinese guard.

"They are really exporting Chinese tactics to Berlin, which I think is very sad," Shao told DW-WORLD. "We should use German democracy to influence China and not let the Chinese dictatorship, bullying ordinary citizens, export those techniques to Berlin."

Germany's Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Investigations Office) spokesman, Gerhard Schlemmer, said the action was justified by "information received that some people may disturb the visit of the Chinese delegation."

Answering protestors' allegations that German police had granted Chinese security agents extraordinary access in Berlin -- including direct access to the private hotel's computer registry to track Chinese names -- Schlemmer said only that "it is normal that there is cooperation between the German security police and the police of a visiting delegation."

Some 400 Falun Gong followers, all with apparently peaceful intentions, came to Berlin and staged silent protests at locations visited by Jiang, but they were kept hundreds of metres away from the leader by police fences and vehicle blockades.

Most sat cross-legged on the pavement, meditating, and others walked with placards opposing Beijing's policies

They repeated accusations, backed up by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, that Falun Gong followers have been killed, tortured, subjected to unfair trials and imprisoned in a general Chinese crackdown against the loosely-organised group.

According to the Falun Gong's central information centre, at least 390 deaths have occurred, as well as 100,000 detentions, 20,000 sentences to labour camps and 1,000 wrongful forced stays in mental hospitals.

China on the other hand accuses the "crooked" practitioners of Falun Gong of running a "typical cult", luring followers with false promises of healing without medicine and then deceiving them with "bewitching and mind-controlling power". Yet there is little organised hierarchy in Falun Gong and no membership rolls.

Protestors' chance for direct confrontation with Jiang, which some said they had hoped for, never materialised. The Chinese leader, who had been forewarned that human rights issues could overshadow his visit, limited public exposure, saying he would hold no press conference because of time constraints.

Dana Cheng, a US citizen born whose appearance and surname betray her Chinese nationality, said that when police forced her out of the Adlon on grounds of "security", she asked "what about my security?" before being taken out of her room without a chance to recover toiletries.

Mild though the protestors' allegations against German police were -- Shao repeatedly said that they seemed "reluctant" in their actions and at times apologised for the orders they carried out -- they said the actions were more reminiscent of Beijing than Berlin.

Stepped-up security in the German capital since the September 11 attacks against the United States may be partly to blame.

Germany's government has previously criticised Beijing's strict policy against unregistered religious groups, exerted also against Christians and Tibetan Buddhists.

But Chancellor Gerhard Schröder opted not to speak out during Jiang's visit.

Higher-level politics and trade were on the agenda, as the Chinese president came promising to support the idea of a permanent German seat on the United Nations Security Council.

"The leaders exchanged views on human rights. Both agreed there were differences of opinion and agreed on dialogue to resolve this problem and improve the global human rights situation," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan told a news conference.

http://dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1434_A_494522_1_A,00.html

Pressured by their Superiors, Weifang's Police Tortured Members of Banned Sect

By Ian Johnson

12/26/2000
The Wall Street Journal

WEIFANG, China -- Rising out of the North China Plain in a jumble of dusty apartment blocks and crowded roads, this is an unremarkable Chinese city in every respect but one: Local police regularly torture residents to death.

Since the beginning of the year, when police killed a 58-year-old retiree, at least 10 more Weifang residents have died in police custody, according to relatives and a human-rights monitoring group. All were practitioners of the spiritual group Falun Dafa, which the central government banned last year. Across this country of 1.3 billion, at least 77 Falun Dafa adherents have now died in detention, according to reports by human-rights groups. Weifang, which has less than 1% of the national population, accounts for 15% of those deaths.

Why?

The answer has its roots in imperial China, when the country developed a system of social control that is still used today. It puts huge pressure on local officials to comply with central edicts -- but gives them absolute discretion over implementation. For officials running Weifang, that meant they were under strict orders to eliminate the huge number of Falun Dafa protesters in their district but faced no scrutiny of the methods they used.

That led to a series of bizarre and ultimately tragic decisions. Under intense pressure to stem the flow of protesters heading to Beijing, Weifang officials stationed police in Beijing, ran their own prison there and sent detainees to "transformation centers" back home where they were beaten until they renounced their faith, or died. The ferocity of police in these centers only increased after higher-level officials started fining their subordinates for each protester who arrived in the capital, according to city officials and former detainees.

Besides explaining the mechanics of death, this city's tale also points to the direction this conflict is likely to take in the future. With the two-year anniversary of Beijing's still-unsuccessful crackdown on Falun Dafa approaching in the spring -- a duration that far exceeds any other challenge during the Communists' five decades in power -- efforts to crush the group have become a grinding battle between a stubborn government and a hard core of believers. Like the Tiananmen protests of 1989, it has left countless scars below the surface of society, and has become another marker on China's painful path to modernization.

Weifang hardly seems like the sort of place that would become the focal point of tragedy. Indeed, if one were trying to find an Anytown in China, Weifang might be it. It has a famous past as a commercial center and is the hometown of flowing, silk-covered Chinese kites. Today, it is a small industrial center in one of China's wealthiest provinces and boasts a per-capita income slightly above the national average.

Like most Chinese cities, Weifang feels more rural than its population would indicate. Officially, the greater metropolitan area has eight million residents, but this includes a huge swath of densely populated countryside. The urban center has just 620,000 people, and its streets are filled with farmers driving their tractors to markets. Like most parts of China, foreigners are still so rare that people stop and stare when one walks past.

Falun Dafa, which is also known as Falun Gong , caught on early here and across Shandong province, a densely populate coastal region that has developed rapidly in the past decade. Some say the group's Shandong organizers were especially gifted; others note that its founder paid a successful visit to the province several years ago. Falun Dafa, which teaches slow-motion calisthenics and moral precepts drawn from Taoism and Buddhism, certainly fit in with the region's spiritual tradition: Confucius' birthplace, Qufu, and one of China's holiest Taoist pilgrimage sites, Mt. Tai, are located nearby.

By 1999, Weifang had one of heaviest concentrations of believers in the province, with an estimated 60,000 adherents, according to an unpublished government report. The town's parks and squares had regular meeting points for members, who typically practice their exercises every morning. That ended when about 10,000 Falun Dafa practitioners protested in downtown Beijing in April, 1999, asking the government that their group be legalized. The central government responded by banning Falun Dafa in July; Weifang authorities followed suit, rounding up local Falun Dafa organizers and closing down the public exercise spots.

Initially, Weifang was quiet, adherents and government officials say. In November of last year, however, Beijing staged show trials of several prominent Falun Dafa organizers, spurring what has become a steady stream of protests in the capital. It was at that time that the woman who would become Weifang's first victim, Chen Zixiu, traveled to Beijing. After being arrested, sent back to Weifang and then released, she was detained again earlier this year and beaten to death, according to eyewitnesses. Her case was reported in The Wall Street Journal earlier this year.

The officials' brutality toward Ms. Chen seemed exceptional at the time. Torture in China is common, but even Ms. Chen's family thought that her death was an aberration, the result of an especially cruel jailer. Since then, however, Falun Dafa practitioners have died regularly in Weifang's prisons, about one a month, casting doubt on the idea that one person is responsible. Instead, it appears that the violence is systemic, stemming from policies adopted in Beijing and implemented locally.

Officials in Beijing set up the framework for the killings one year ago after they became impatient with the continued flow of protesters from around China into the capital. Deciding drastic measures were needed, they reached for a tried-and-true method of enforcing central edicts, one honed over centuries of imperial rule.

Based on the 2,200-year-old bao jia method of controlling society, the system pushes responsibility for following central orders onto neighborhoods, with the local boss responsible for the actions of everyone in his territory. In ancient times, that meant the headman of a family or clan was personally responsible for paying taxes, raising troops and apprehending criminals.

A variant of this is now in use to implement even broader policy goals. After the Communist Party launched economic reforms in the late 1970s, it had great success by signing "contracts" with peasants and factory chiefs, who had to deliver a certain amount of grain or industrial output but were given complete latitude over the methods used. By the late 1980s, provincial governors were also signing similar contracts, being held personally responsible for maintaining grain output in their province or holding down births to a certain level.

Now the problem was Falun Dafa. The government's Office 610, a bureau that was coordinating the crackdown, issued an order in December 1999, telling officials of local governments they would be held personally responsible if they didn't stem the flow of protesters to Beijing, according to Weifang officials. As in years past, no questions would be asked about how this was achieved -- success was all that mattered.

Weifang officials knew the policy meant trouble for them. China has other concentrations of Falun Dafa believers, such as in the country's northeast where the group was founded. But those are remote from the capital. Weifang is located just 300 miles southeast of Beijing, making it easy for protesters to travel to the capital even after the city took an initial precaution of sending security agents to train and bus stations. "After a while the police were waiting for us at the train station, so we started to bike and walk to Beijing," confirms a 48-year-old practitioner. "It takes four days to bike to Beijing, 12 days to walk. I did it both ways."

As the flow of protesters continued into the new year, central authorities didn't have far to look to find a scapegoat. The man held responsible was Wu Guangzheng, the 62-year-old governor of Shandong province. Mr. Wu is a member of the Communist Party's 21-member Politburo, making him one of the most powerful men in China. But Mr. Wu was in a precarious position. Most Politburo members are central-government officials. Only two governors sit on the Politburo: Mr. Wu and the governor of Guangdong province, which doesn't have many protesters. That meant Mr. Wu was a focal point of Politburo meetings called to discuss the protests. "The central government told Governor Wu that he was personally responsible. He risked losing his job if he didn't do something," said a Weifang official, now retired. "Everyone knew the pressure he was under."

Mr. Wu quickly found ways to transfer the pressure. First, Weifang city officials say, Mr. Wu ensured that every official in the city knew what was at stake, by calling a meeting of police and government officials to a "study session." There, the central government's directive was read out loud. "The government instructed us to limit the number of protesters or be responsible," says another government official.

Such methods quickly led to abuses. Several Falun Dafa adherents imprisoned by local police early this year say their captors told them that their continued protests threatened to derail officials' careers. "One policeman beat me with truncheons," says a 43-year-old factory worker imprisoned in December 1999. "He said we were responsible for his boss's political problems."

That detainee was beaten after being arrested in Beijing and transferred back to his hometown of Weifang. City officials said such arrests reflected badly on Governor Wu and the rest of the province because people arrested in Beijing are booked by central security agents and their hometown noted. Statistics are then compiled, and provinces with a high number of protesters -- like Shandong -- are criticized. Beating people in Weifang might eventually slow down the number of protesters, but authorities wanted results immediately.

So, earlier this year, local officials devised a plan to skirt Beijing's monitoring of their performance. Like many other cities, Weifang maintains a permanent representative bureau in the capital that functions as a lobbying office and a hostel for bureaucrats visiting the capital on business. The city doubled the office's staff to 40 and stationed about a dozen police officers in Beijing. Their cars, identifiable by their license plates, often park on the side streets around Tiananmen Square when protests take place.

According to an employee in the office and Falun Dafa adherents who were arrested, Weifang residents detained in Beijing were then handed over directly to Weifang police, who drove the practitioners to the representative office, which now functioned as a prison. The staff there watched over them until they were transferred back to Weifang. The arrangement suited Beijing police, who were able to shift some of their work burden. And it helped Weifang's image, because the detainees wouldn't be booked in Beijing prisons and show up on the central government's tally of laggard provinces.

Few detainees say they were beaten in the Beijing representative office. Instead, they were sent directly to one of seven locally run "transformation centers" -- which earlier on were called "education and study centers" -- set up in Weifang. It was at these unofficial prisons that the killings occured.

Use of these "centers" coincided with another policy change that added what probably was the final ingredient needed for the killings to take place: a ferocity brought on by fear of financial ruin.

Instead of just threatening to ruin local officials' careers, Mr. Wu's colleagues in the provincial government started to fine them as well. The new twist was simple: The provincial government fined mayors and heads of counties for each Falun Dafa practitioner from their district who went to Beijing. The mayors and county heads in turn fined the heads of their Political and Legal Commissions, holding them responsible. They in turn fined village chiefs, who in turn fined the police officers -- who administered the punishment. The fines varied from district to district, but in one Weifang district the head of the Political and Legal Commission was fined 200 yuan per person protesting in Tiananmen Square, or about $25 -- a potentially ruinous amount given that his monthly salary is only about $200, according to one of the official's colleagues.

The fines were illegal; no law or regulation has ever been issued in writing that lists them. Officials say the policy was announced orally at government meetings. "There was never to be anything in writing because they didn't want it made public," says a member of the city's Political and Legal Commission.

Thus a chief feature in torture victims' testimony is that they were constantly being asked for money to compensate for the fines. For example, the family of Weifang's first victim, Ms. Chen, was told to pay a $241 fine in exchange for her release. When the family balked, Ms. Chen was held another night and beaten to death.

Relatives and fellow prisoners of other victims tell similar stories. For example, the most recent prisoner to die in Weifang, Xuan Chengxi, was killed in October after officials asked him repeatedly for money, according to two people who tended to his wounds before he died. All the members of his family, however, were Falun Dafa practitioners and had lost their jobs, leaving them unable to pay. Police responded by beating him with rubber truncheons and dousing him in cold water for several hours before he fell into a coma and died, the witnesses say.

Weifang city officials -- many of whom now privately worry that the crackdown has been a terrible mistake -- say none of the police directly involved in the deaths have been reprimanded. In fact, the three officers who oversaw Ms. Chen's interrogation have since been promoted, they say, true to the tradition of giving local authorities a free hand, no questions asked.

The cumulative effect is that 11 Falun Dafa practitioners have died from abuse they suffered in Weifang prisons this year, according to family members and eyewitnesses interviewed for this article. An independent human-rights monitoring group in Hong Kong, the Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, has verified one more death, for a total of 12. According to the center, the rest of Shandong accounts for another 12 victims, for a total of 24. The next-highest number of deaths is 14 for Heilongjiang province.

Nationally, the latitude given by the central government was likely responsible for other deaths as well. Falun Dafa claims a total of 91 practitioners have died from police brutality; Amnesty International, the London-based human-rights group, says the total is 77.

Besides resulting in deaths, the policy has driven people underground, ruined careers and split families. Two Falun Dafa adherents who worked in the city government, for example, have been forced to leave their homes. Like dozens of other adherents, they live with relatives out of fear of arrest.

Their daughter, also a Falun Dafa practitioner, was kicked out of university for refusing to renounce her faith and now floats from family to family. "This won't go on much longer, will it?" she asks a visitor. "The government has to relent and legalize us. That's all we're asking."

The effects on society of such systematic brutality is hard to gauge. None of the deaths have been reported in the Chinese media. Only those directly touched by the crackdown know of its scope and ferocity. In a country of 1.3 billion, most are ignorant and many accept the state-run media's explanation that Falun Dafa is a dangerous cult, a mind-controlling organization that must be crushed at all costs to preserve stability.

But in a small city like Weifang, word of the deaths has spread quietly. In the city's impressive kite museum, a curator's eyes widen when he is asked about the killings. "No one can talk about these things," he says, unpacking boxes of the city's trademark wood-framed kites wrapped in brightly colored silk. "But a lot of people know."

(Copyright (c) 2000, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)

http://www.faluninfo.net/specialreports/jiangspersonalcrusade/

Posting date: 12/26/2002
Original article date: 12/24/2002
Category: News & Media Reports

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